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Abstract
Abstract
In many
many environments,
environments, the input mechanism to a computer system is
is severely
severely constrained. For example, a disabled
abled person may only be capable of yes/no
yeslno responses to
prompts
prompts from
from the screen (by different nods of the head,
eye
eye movements,
movements, hand movements,
movements, or even by different
thought patterns that are
are captured by a sensor). Alternatively,
natively, the user may
msy not suffer from
from any impairment
the environment precludes the use of a keyboard or
yet the
keypad, as
as happens with tiny portable devices such as
keypad,
some
.mp3 players, voice sensors at the
some of the smallel
smaller mp3
doors
doors of restricted-access areas,
areas, and hands-free situasuch as
as construction
constr~~r:tion
sites, operation of a motions such
work sites,
vehicle, etc.
etc. Finally,
Finally, a case can be made,
made, in situations
tor vehicle,
shoulder-surfing is prevalent (such as in crowded
where shoulder-surfing
cyber-cafes), for
for deliberately restricting
resmcting the input to be
cyber-cafes),
is hard to detect by a shoulder-surfer
a response that is
(e.g., left-click vs right-click), even though the user in
(e.g.,
keyboard and is perfectly capable of
such cases has a keyboard
using it.
it. Requiring the
,the user to remember a long ranusing
dom bit string
string and
and to
to'authenticate
dom
authenticate by entering each bit in
the yes/no
yeslno available
available input mechanism,
mechanism, is completely imthe
This paper deals with the question of authenpractical. This
tication in such
such environments
environments where the inputs are conto be yes/no
yeslno responses to statements
statements displayed
strained to
PassWit, a mnemonicscreen. We present PassWit,
on the user's screen.
for such
such environments that combines good
based system for
usability with high security,
security, and has many additional feafeausability
tures such
such as
as (to mention a few)
few) resistance to phishing,
tures
keystroke-logging, resistance to duress and physical couser, and
and compatibility with currently deercion of the user,
ployed systems
systems and
and password file
file formats (hence it can
co-exist with existing login mechanism).
mechanism). An important
ingredient in our recipe is the use of a mnemonic that
enables the user to produce a long enough (hence more
enables
yeslno answers
answers to displayed
secure) string of appropriate yes/no
prompts (i.e., challenges). Another important ingredient is
is the non-adaptive nature of these
these challenges -- so
ent

they are inherently non-revealing to a shoulder-surfer or
of words
phisher. The mnemonic is a sentence or a set of
known only to the user and authenticating server (in the
server they are stored in a cryptographically protected
- the users are never asked
way rather than in the clear) to enter their mnemonics to the system, they only use
the mnemonic to answer the server's challenge questions.
Our usage of
of text for mnemonics is not necessary but it
is what we implemented for reasons of
of convenience and
compatibility with existing login mechanisms; we could
equally well have used speech, video, or pictures.

1 Introduction
In 1998,
1998, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to require Federal agencies to make their electronic and information technology accessible to people with disabil[I]. A major focus of
of the accessibility research
ities [1].
is to improve the design of
of electronic interfaces in a
way that does not prevent users with disabilities (especially vision) from viewing them or navigating through
them [7, 61.
6]. There have not been many studies on electronic accessibility issues for users with motor disabilities [14].
The ability to securely use computer resources and the
web provides more freedom for users with disabilities: It
enhances their educational and entrepreneurial opportunities [14],
[14], as well as their ability to stay in touch with
friends and family,
family, to manage their finances,
finances, or shop online, all without having to rely on other humans to do it
on their behalf
behalf (thereby improving their privacy as well).
Many of the deployed regular authentication systems
are difficult (even impossible) to use under the belowmentioned environments,
environments, environments that our system
is designed to handle.
• Users with motor-disabilities:
motor-disabilities: Not only paralyzed patients (that have cerebral palsy, paraplegia,
quadriplegia,
quadriplegia, etc.), but also users who have rheuma-

system, since it is compatible with text consoles and LED
screens. There is no language restriction for our system,
system,
it can be implemented for languages other than English.
Before going into the details of our system, we will
briefly mention the challenges we need to overcome and
give a glimpse of how our system approaches
approaches them:

toid arthritis or hand tremor 1,
I , or who are temporarily unable to use their hands (e.g., due to a broken
arm or repetitive stress injury).
• Input constrained devices: Authentication using
tiny portable devices such as some of the smaller
mp3 players, game consoles, home entertainment
systems,
systems, voice sensors at the doors of restrictedaccess areas, hands-free situations such as construction work sites, operation of a motor vehicle, etc.

• The authentication system would be able to work in
input-constrained environments. Users with motor
disabilities can input through switches that can be
activated by simple muscle movements (e.g. raising
the eye brow or eye-lid) or brain signals [11,
[1 l , 55,, 17].
171.
In order to free these users from the need to ask the
help of another person while authenticating themselves to these systems, one has to come up with a
secure authentication system that is usable by anyone who can control such a switch. In our scheme,
only yeslno
yes/no answers are enough for authentication.
Of course the ability to provide yeslno
yes/no inputs makes
it possible to transmit any random bit string but it
does not help at all for remembering which bit string
to transmit (even the luxury of writing the password
on a sticky note may not be available to the disabled person). Our scheme, on the other hand, is
mnemonic-based and makes it possible to securely
remember a long random bit string,
string, by remembering only a relatively short sentence.

• Inherently non-private environments: Authentication when shoulder-surfing is unavoidable such as
in crowded places (e.g Internet access points, coffee
shops, cyber cafes), in places where there are many
surveillance cameras (e.g., labs, airports,
airports, shopping
malls, etc.), in tight spaces such as an airplane while
sitting in economy class next to another passenger.
passenger.

We designed a system, PassWit,
PassWit, that enables users to
achieve security of truly random passwords by remembering just a mnemonic sentence (which they have several choices to pick from),
from), and these users will be able
to securely authenticate themselves by just answering a
series of "yes/no"
"yeslno" questions.
questions.
This can be achieved without requiring any special input device, or any computation at client site. The authentication questions are designed in a way that a short
mnemonic sentence can encode a long password. There
is no restriction on the size of the mnemonic sentence or
the password, if desired the security (hence the length)
of the passwords can be increased by requiring the user
to remember more than one sentence.
sentence. Another important
ingredient is the non-adaptive nature of these challenges
-- so they are inherently non-revealing to a shouldershouldersurfer or phisher.
PassWit is safe against many attacks including shoulder surfing,
surfing, phishing, and acoustic attack.
attack. We use several measures against each type of these attacks such
as displaying one challenge at a time, or displaying the
challenges in graphical CAPTCHA [21]
[21] 2 format if the
environment allows graphical display.
display. We also achieve
duress resistance, which we will discuss more in the following sections.
Our design can work side-by-side with text passwords
in UNIX systems. It is also compatible with pure text
based interfaces as well as other media interfaces that
can represent the text mnemonics (e.g. speech, video,
pictures, etc.).
Moreover,
Moreover, using text for mnemonics (as opposed to
pictures, video or audio) brings more flexibility
flexibility to our

• Mnemonics have to be easy-to-remember sentences. Users with motor disability can be elder
memory.
people that do not have a very strong memory.
PassWit encodes a long random password with a
short mnemonic sentence.
sentence. Besides that, we use
the news headlines as our corpus for generating the
mnemonic sentences. We used newspaper headlines
since they summarize a story,
story, thus form a connected
discourse, which was experimentally shown [15]
[15] to
be much easier to learn than same amount of nonsense. Automatically generating easy to remember
mnemonics with video or images is a more challenging task.
• Shoulder-surfing attacks are very hard to avoid by
disabled users, who are always in areas that are
crowded (such as hospitals, or care centers) or always have a second person (e.g., day care nurses)
around. PassWit has several measures for protecting the user against shoulder-surfing: i) using
mnemonic based passwords, ii) not asking the user
to enter the password directly, but performing authentication by asking the user a series of "yes/no"
"yeslno"
questions,
questions, iii) offering a different set of challenge
questions at each time of authentication, iv) making the use of an input device that can be covered
possible (such as a mouse or other haptic device ).
).

1
' According
~ c c o r d i nto~International Essential Tremor Foundation, up to 10
10
million Americans have Essential Tremor
2?stands
stands for "Completely
"Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart"
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2 System Overview

• The authentication system should not require the
cany an extra portable device (e.g. calcuuser to carry
lator) or even a paper and a pen. In PassWit the
user just
just reads the challenge statements prompted
h i d e r at authentication time, and if the chalto him/her
lenge contains one of the mnemonic words the user
inputs "yes",
"yes", otherwise "no".
"no".

We propose PassWit,
PassWit, an authentication system that is
based on mnemonic passwords [18], whose details will
be described in the following subsections, where P denotes the user's previously existing (and securely generated) password bit string (for now we assume Pis
7Jis 40 bits
long, but we can accommodate any other length).

• The password initialization and reset should be
easy. In PassWit, initialization consists of askasking the users on which topic they would like their
mnemonic sentence to be, and later providing them
many alternative mnemonic sentences. Note that
the users can use only yes/no
yeslno answers to input their
choice of mnemonic sentence. At reset time, the
user will go through the same process as the password initialization.

2.1
2.1 Password initialization step
1.
1. The system generates a number of random sentences 81,
sl, ...
. . . ,8>.
, sx and displays them to the user.
user.
See Figure 1. Each sentence has a length of
jJ words (not counting functional
p
functional words such
as "the",
"the", "a",
"a", "with").
"with). In our implementation
= 10.
10. For example, 82
sa could come
jJ =
we used p
from tracing a random 1eft-to-right
left-to-right path along the
columns of Table 1,
I, using some of the password
bits to select one word from each column. In
this case, 4 password bits are used per column
and first column shows
shows the bit string encoded by
the words in the same row. For example, if P ==
0101100101010011111101001000101010001101
0101100101010011111101001000l0l010001101
then the resulting 82
sz is Angry union artists simply
dismissed demand to forgive the laziness of
of the
crazy mayor.
rnayol: Each 8i
si is selected from a separate
table like Table 1 which was derived from a different text source (e.g.,
(e.g., one table from sports, one
from stock markets, one from animals, etc). We
did not use advanced natural language processing
techniques in the generation of these tables, and
this is an area for future extensions of this work.

• Mnemonics have to be secure. They can not be a
popular quote, or the lyrics of a well known song.
We achieve this security by using a previously pro[18] to generate
posed password mnemonic system [18]
our mnemonic sentences.

It is easy to come up with yes/no
yeslno mechanisms for auauthentication in constrained environments, that are conceptually simple but that suffer from a lack of security,
security,
poor usability,
usability, or both. This paper presents an authentication method that combines good usability with security. An important feature of our scheme includes full
resistance to replay attacks by someone who can observe
only the user's sequence of yes/no
yestno responses (but not the
mnemonics from which they are derived,
derived, and that are
safely stored between the user's two ears): Such an attacker acquires no advantage whatsoever over someone
who did not observe the yes/no
yeslno sequence for that login session (in fact the yeslno
yes/no sequence is indistinguishable from a random binary sequence). Our scheme also
offers full resistance to a phishing attack:
attack: Mnemonics
are shared secrets between the user and the authenticating server and the users are never asked to enter their
mnemonics to the system. The users can detect an adversary that does not know the shared secret. Otherwise an adversary does not gain any information about
the password even if the user answers random phishing
challenges.

2. The user selects one of the above 8/S,
si's, suppose it
consists of the successive words m1,
m l , m2, ...
. . . ,miL'
,m,.
3. The column from which word mj
m j was selected (call
it G
)
contains
what
we
call
the
equivalence class
Cj)
j
(in that table) of the word mj'
m j . We use rr to denote the size of an equivalence class; in our examexample r == 16.
16. The user does not need to memorize
the equivalence class (only mj
m j needs to be remembered).

2.2 Authentication step
For j == 1,
tum, the system asks the user, f!.t ==
1 , ...
. . . ,jJ
, p in turn,
10g
log,2 r questions (f!
(e == 4 in our example) about column
G
Cj,
follows.
j , as follows.

Section 2 includes an overview of the system and how
a user will interact with the system. Section 3 covers
our adversary model. We will discuss the details of the
system and our implementation in Section 4. The work
on related literature will be summarized in Section 5.

1.
1. The system randomly permutes the entries of column Gj
Cj before creating the challenges at each sessession (which foils a replay attack). For the ith entry
Cjj in the permuted order, let bi,3bi,2bi,1
b i , ~ b i , , bbi,o
b~i,,~~be the
of G
3

to the user that something seriously phishy is going on (in
phact even if the phisher got the perhaps-careless user to
respond to very unfamiliar challenges, those responses
are useless to such an attacker). The randomized display
of the contents of a Qk
Q k are aimed at foiling an adversary
who is trying to decode the CAPTCHAs and might gain
information if they appear in a predictable order (e.g.,
alphabetical).

binary representation of i.
i. For instance last column
of Table I1 might be permuted as {leader,
{leader, senator,
senator,
enemy, foe,
foe, king, queen, president, chairman, children,
mayor, friend,
friend, ally,
ally, associate, assistant,
assistant, mandren, mayor,
ager,
ager, supporter}.
supporter).
2. The system creates 4 sets Q3,
Qg, Q2,
Q2, Q1, Qo
QOsuch that
Cjj is included in
the ith word of the permuted C
Qk
Q k if and only if bi,k == 1.
1. For the permutation of C
Clo
step, Qo
Qo would be
10 in the previous step,
{senator,
{senator, foe,
foe, queen, chairman, mayor, ally,
ally, assisQ1 would be {enemy,
{enemy, foe,
foe, prestant, supporter},
supporter), Q1
ident,
ident, chairman, friend,
friend, ally,
ally, manager, supporter},
supporter),
Q2
Qz would be {king, queen, president, chairman, asassociate, assistant,
Q3 would
assistant, manager, supporter}
supporter) Q3
be {children, mayor, friend,
friend, ally,
ally, associate,
associate, assistant, manager, supporter}.
supporter). Since the entry leader
has index i =
= 0 in the permutation of this example
session, it does not appear in any of the Qk.
Q k . See
Figure 2 for the challenges of this session,
session, which
are displayed in random order (as opposed to alphabetical order) as CAPTCHAs for added security
against sophisticated malicious software (the random re-ordering as well as the CAPTCHA representation are not needed if there is no threat of such
an adversary).

3 Adversary Model
We assume that the information used by the system during the mnemonic creation is public and the adversary
has equal (or more) computational power than our syssystem.
We foresee
foresee five possible types of attacks on this
scheme:
• Shoulder-surfing: This type of adversary is assumed to have the ability to physically record the
authentication session of the user (possibly with
a video recording device such as a cell phone).
The only thing that appears on the screen is the
challenge statements, the answers of the user are
not displayed. After the user answers the current
challenge, the system refreshes the screen to display the next challenge. It is possible to prevent a
shoulder-surfing adversary from obtaining the challenges by displaying them in the form of graphical
CAPTCHAs [21].
[2 1 1. Even though the shoulder surfer
can successfully record and resolve the content of
the challenges, the only way she/he
shehe can learn the
answers is by observing the user's activities while
inputing the answers. For defense against a shoulder surfer that can effectively observe and record
the CAPTCHAchallenges
CAPTCHA challenges and the user's activities
at the same time, we recommend the use of input devices that can be operated easily under the table or
another cover (such as remote control, mouse buttons or keyboard keys which can be covered by the
other hand or other haptic devices).

3. Fork
For k == 3,2,1,0
3 , 2 , l ,0 in tum,
turn, the system displays Qk
Q k to
the user who answers "Yes"
"Yes" if the mnemonic word
mj (corresponding to the current column C
Cj)
j ) is in
Qk>
Q k , and answers "No"
"No" otherwise. The contents of
each Qkk are displayed in random order each authentication round. (There is no need to randomly permute the ordering of the Qk'S
Qk's to foil a replay attack, as they have already been implicitly permuted
by the above-mentioned permutation of the column
C
cjj .).>
More on the rationale and security of the above is
said later.
later. For now we note that (i) the user's answers
uniquely identify to the server the mnemonic word in
each column; (ii) the total number of questions is logarithmic in the size rr of each column, so that password
security can be increased by a factor of 21'
2 p by doubling
the size of a column yet adding only I1 extra question per
column (and, more importantly,
importantly, without any increase in
the size of the mnemonic, i.e., without further burdening
the user's memory); (iii) a shoulder-surfer adversary sees
the questions
yes/no answers (hence
questions but not the user's yeslno
learns nothing); (iv) that a keystroke-logger sees the ananswers but cannot use them to authenticate itself or to obtain the passwords unless it can relate these answers to
the challenges (which are preferably obfuscated as in the
figure);
figure); (v) that a phisher adversary does not even know
what questions to display,
display, immediately alerting the user

• Malicious Software (Spy-ware, keystroke-logger
etc.): Malicious software can record what is being
sent by the authentication server as challenges and
what is being sent by the user as response. For dedefense againstthis
against this adversary our PassWit can be used
in conjunction with CAPTCHAs.
• Brute-force attack: This type of adversary has
access only to the encrypted password file (e.g.,
"/etc/passwd").
"Ietclpasswd"). PassWit does not weaken the security of the existing authentication system and is
based on mnemonic passwords, which lets the users

4

0000
0001
0001
0010
0011
001 1
0100
0101
0101
0110
01 10
0111
01 11
1000
1000
1001
1001
1010
1010
1011
1011
1100
1100
1101
1101
1110
1110
1111
1111

leading
peaceful
thoughtful
thoughtful
rich
uninterested
provoked
angry
angry
outraged
outraged
neutral
neutral
furious
furious
poor
average
average
determined
strong
strong
calm
silent
ordinary
ordinarv

U.S.
viking
romanian
city
rural
irish
suburban
texan
aussie
aussie
canadian
union
british
european
european
downtown
downtown
urban
italian
french
french

couturiers
tailor
cartoonist
beekeeper
realist
firefighters
firefighters
artist
architect
police
cubist
farmer
farmer
fantasist
fantasist
developer
developer
farmer
goldsmith
musician
drivers
drivers

strongly
alarmingly
hardly
suddenly
sudden1y
simply
warily
doubtfully
doubtfully
remarkably
again
blindly
suspiciously
suspiciously
delicately
fiercely
fiercely
repeatedly
reluctantly
discreetly
slowly
slowlv

resist
welcome
agree
agree
reject
embrace
resist
renounce
submit
honor
recognize
recognize
allow
accept
surrender
tolerate
tolerate
permit
permil
refuse
dismiss
dismiss

pressure
pressure
attempt
attempt
haste
duress
duress
pressure
pressure
demand
bid
call
ultimatum
struggle
struggle
operation
order
imperative
imperative
hurry
insistence
insistence
ban
decree
decree

+
regulate
regulate
modify
alter
cement
manipulate
manipulate
secure
fix
quantify
quantify
measure
measure
forgive
forgive
change
limit
throttle
harness
harness
deregulate
deregulate
restrict
fiddle
fiddle

thinness
thinness
rent
wisdom
culture
culture
education
diligence
diligence
weakness
salary
salary
pension
thinness
thinness
obedience
obedience
laziness
spirit
tenuity
slenderness
slenderness
citizenship
citizenship
discipline
discioline

popular
passive
inept
able

1

1

models
queen
( leader (
senator
dull
supporter
king
hot
skilled
ally
adept
foe
foe
dormant manager
crazy
friend
gifted president
enemy
bright
witless children
exhausted associate
associate
talented
mayor
clumsy chairman
sharp
sham assistant I

Table I:
I : The mnemonic generation table for the sentence
sentence "Leading U.S. couturiers are strongly
strongly resisting pressure to regulate
regulate the
thinness of the popular models." The order of words within a column is randomly
randomly determined.
determined.

4 Implementation
Implementation Details

to have random passwords that are secure against
dictionary attacks [18].
[18].

We assume that the environment enables the user to read
(or hear,
hear, in the case of vision impairment) the challenges
displayed on the screen and the user can input the yes/no
yeslno
answers through a switch activated by muscle movemovements or brain signals. The system includes a large set of
S , which are already populated offline.
offline. These tatables, S,
bles, such as Table I,
I , are used for generating mnemonic
sentences and challenges. Each table has a unique ID.
ID.
Every table corresponds to a source sentence from a corpus, and these source sentences are stored in the first
first row
of the table. Table 1 was generated using the example
source sentence "Leading U.S. couturiers are strongly resisting pressure to regulate the thinness of the popular
models."
models."
In Table 1,
1, the first
first row includes the source sentence
(since functional words are not used for mnemonic generation they are excluded). Every column in this table
shows a possible candidate word set for replacing the
original word in the first
first row.

• Phishing: Mnemonics are shared secrets between
the user and the authenticating server,
server, and the server
has to use the knowledge of the mnemonics to generate the challenge prompts. Thus, PassWit inherently has full resistance to phishing attacks by
an adversary who does not have this knowledge.
The users are never asked to enter their mnemonics to the system; instead, they will be prompted
with challenges that can be correctly answered only
by someone who has full knowledge of the content of the mnemonic. Since the users will be
looking for mnemonic words to appear in the challenge prompts, they will very soon (after seeing one
or two challenges) realize that the authenticating
server does not know the shared secret.
• Physically armed attacker ("Duress"):
("Duress"): Duress
codes are needed in case of an armed attack, where
the user needs a way to alert the police, while obeying all requests of the attacker.
attacker. Several home alarm
systems already handle this situation by providing
home owners a duress code together with the regular code.
code. Duress code will turn off the alarm,
alarm, but it
will also send an alert to the police. Same idea can
be deployed for any type of password protected acaccount, where the duress code lets the user in, alerts
the police and possibly asks
asks the system to adjust the
information accessible to a duress situation. PassWit is designed to have duress codes, that the user
can enter to login under duress. See Section 4 for
details on how duress codes are implemented.

4.1 Mnemonic Creation
Creation
At mnemonic-creation time, the system first
first generates a
P, for the user (e.g. a random string
random password, P,
of 40 bits), or the user's existing password is used. Next
step is generating the possible candidates for mnemonic
sentences that will encode this password.
If
If the source sentence has 10
10 words as in our example
sentence, and each of these words have 16
16 alternatives;
alternatives; a
random password chooses one word out of each of these
16
16 alternative words,
words, hence encodes 4 bits per word, 40
bits in total.
5

test for
for a subset tells
tells whether that subset
subset contains
contains a dedefective element.
element. If the set size
size is
is r and the number of
fective
defective
d, then the goal is
is
defective elements is
is no more than d,
to pinpoint all
all the
the defective
defective elements
elements by making as
as few
few
to
group tests
tests as
as possible.
possible. This
This research area
area arose
arose out of
group
the
the need to
to test blood supplies
supplies for
for syphilis antigens
antigens durduring
ing the
the last World
World War:
War: Each
Each test was
was expensive,
expensive, and
and
samples was
was unacunacusing one
one test
test for
for each
each of the
the r blood samples
using
ceptable, hence
hence the
the idea
idea of group
group testing by using each
each
ceptable,
test on
on aa mixture
mixture of blood droplets
droplets from
from aa subset
subset of the
the r
test
blood samples
samples [10].
[lo]. The
The original problem was
was adaptive
adaptive
the
in the
the sense
sense that test ii + 11 could be designed after the
in
was known,
known, thereby enabling
enabling aa simsimoutcome of test ii was
outcome
search for
for the
the defective
defective element
element in
in the
the special
special
ple binary search
= 1.
1. The
The non-adaptive version of the
the problem
case of dd =
case
is when
when all
all the
the tests
tests are
are done
done in
in aa single
single round,
round, with
with all
all
is
the subsets
subsets to
to be tested
tested detennined
determined in
in advance.
advance.
the
The analogy
analogy with
with our problem isis as
as follows:
follows: For each
each
The
m j , the
the rr "blood samples" are
are the
the rr
mnemonic word
word mj,
mnemonic
words in
in mj's equivalence
equivalence class.
class. The
The mnemonic
mnemonic word
word is
is
words
like the
the contaminated blood sample.
sample. The
The server presents
like
mj's equivalence
the user
user with aa subset
subset of words
words from
from m/s
the
Cj,
(possibly containing mj) and
and the
the user is
is supsupclass, C
class,
j , (possibly
posed to
to respond yes
yes or no
no based on
on whether mj
m j is
is in
in
posed
(i.e., whether
whether that
that subset
subset is
is "contaminated").
"contaminated").
that subset
subset (i.e.,
that
A shoulder-surfer
shoulder-surfer type
type adversary
adversary sees
sees the
the server's
server's quesquesA
tions, but
but does
does not
not see
see the
the user's
user's yes/no
yeslno answers.
answers. A
A
tions,
keystroke-logger type
type adversary
adversary sees
sees the
the answers
answers but
but not
not
keystroke-logger
the questions.
questions. The
The server
server tests
tests subsets
subsets in
in aa manner
manner that
that
the
enables itit to
to uniquely
uniquely identify
identify mj,
m j , and
and then
then the
the server
server
enables
does aa table
table lookup
lookup (local
(local to
to the
the server)
server) to
to derive
derive the
the
does
mj.
password bit
bit string
string associated
associated with
with mj.
password
Does the
the adversary
adversary learn
learn anything
anything from
from the
the questions?
questions?
Does
To prevent
prevent the
the adversary
adversary from
from learning
learning anything
anything by
by ususTo
ing questions,
questions, itit isis imperative
imperative for
for the
the server
server to
to use
use aa nonnoning
adaptive technique
technique whereby
whereby all
all the
the questions
questions have
have been
been
adaptive
compre-determined well
well in
in advance,
advance, as
as in
in non-adaptive
non-adaptive compre-detennined
binatorial group
group testing.
testing. The
The questions
questions are
are therefore
therefore ininbinatorial
dependent of
of which
which item
item in
in the
the set
set is
is the
the "contaminated"
"contaminated"
dependent
one, and
and hence
hence they
they reveal
reveal nothing
nothing to
to the
the adversary
adversary who
who
one,
sees them.
them. Using
Using adaptive
adaptive group
group testing
testing techniques
techniques (like
(like
sees
binary search)
search) for
for detennining
determining the
the questions
questions would
would be
be
binary
lethal
lethal from
from the
the security
security point
point of
of view.
view.
= 1,
1, for
for which
which an
an £C =
= l1og2
pog, rrll
Our scheme
scheme will
will use
use dd =
Our
test non-adaptive
non-adaptive solution
solution isis well
well known
known and
and in
in fact
fact quite
quite
test
straightforward. We
We briefly
briefly sketch
sketch it,
it, for
for the
the sake
sake of
of makmakstraightforward.
ing
ing this
this paper
paper self-contained.
self-contained. In
In what
what follows
follows CCj
is the
the
j is
m j , where
where IC
ICj
= r.
r . (Recall
(Recall
equivalence class
class of
of word
word mj,
equivalence
j II =
the authentication
authentication step
step described
described in
in Section
Section 2)
2)
the

As
As mentioned in Section 2,
2, candidate sentences
sentences
are
are fonned
formed by tracing a left-to-right path along
along these
columns guided by the P.
P. First column shows
shows the bit
string
string encoded by the
the words
words in
in the
the same
same row.
row.
This
The
P. This
The system
system selects
selects the
the words
words that encode P.
process
process generates
generates one
one candidate mnemonic
mnemonic sentence
sentence per
such
such table.
table. All
All of the
the candidate
candidate mnemonic
mnemonic sentences
sentences enencode
P.
code the
the same
same P.
At the
the end,
end, the
the user
user is
is provided with
with aa set
set of candicandidate
date mnemonic
mnemonic sentences
sentences to
to pick from
from and
and the
the random
password,
P, to
to use
use in
in aa keyboard
keyboard setting
setting if needed.
needed.
password, P,
Mnemonic creation concludes with
with the
the user's selection
selection
of one
one of the
the candidate
candidate mnemonic sentences
sentences for
for rememremembering as
as aa mnemonic.
mnemonic. (see
(see Figure
Figure 1)
1)
Once
Once the
the user
user selects
selects which
which mnemonic
mnemonic sentence
sentence to
to
use,
use, the
the ID
ID of the
the corresponding table
table that
that generated itit is
is
recorded in
S1I bits of the
in the
the least
least significant
significant log2
log, IIS
the salted
salted
hash of the
the password file
file entry.
entry.
Since
we
have
many
Since we have many source
source sentences
sentences (say
(say 1024
1024
of them),
them), the
the user can choose from
from 1024
1024 different
different
mnemonic
mnemonic sentences
sentences generated for
for each
each source
source sentence.
sentence.
However there
there might be psychological attacks
attacks [9]
[9] to
to such
such
aa flexible
flexible system;
system; hence we
we advise
advise only
only aa small
small random
portion
portion of
of these
these possible
possible mnemonics
mnemonics be
be given
given as
as choice
choice
to
to the
the users.
users.

+

4.2
4.2 Mnemonic
Mnemonic Usage
Usage
The
The mnemonic
mnemonic sentence
sentence isis not
not stored
stored in
in the
the system,
system, ininstead
stead the
the source
source table
table ID
ID isis stored
stored in
in the
the salted
salted password
password
hash.
hash. The
The authentication
authentication involves
involves aa conversion
conversion of
of the
the
yes/no
yeslno answers
answers of
of the
the user
user into
into aa password.
password.
We
We achieve
achieve this
this by
by generating
generating the
the challenges
challenges in
in such
such
aa way
way that
that every
every yes/no
yeslno answer
answer narrows
narrows the
the search
search space
space
by
by one-bit,
one-bit, similar
similar to
to the
the idea
idea behind
behind the
the "20-Question
"20-Question
Game"
In our
our scheme,
scheme, instead
instead of
of looking
looking for
for one
one obobGame" 3.3 . In
ject,
ject, we
we are
are searching
searching for
for aa password
password that
that isis composed
composed
of
of concatenation
concatenation of
of several
several substrings,
substrings, each
each of
of which
which isis
encoded
encoded by
by aa different
different word
word of
of the
the mnemonic
mnemonic sentence.
sentence.
Each
Each mnemonic
mnemonic word
word is
is aa member
member of
of an
an equivalence
equivalence
class,
class, and
and we
we need
need to
to ask
ask several
several questions
questions that
that will
will dedetenninistically
terministically find
find the
the exact
exact mnemonic
mnemonic word
word within
within aa
class.
r , (e.g.,
(e.g., 4),
4), questions
questions to
to detennine
determine
class. We
We ask
ask log2
log, r,
one
r , (e.g.,
(e.g., 16),
16), isis the
the number
number
one mnemonic
mnemonic word,
word, where
where r,
of
of words
words in
in an
an equivalence
equivalence class.
class.
The
The key
key idea
idea behind
behind generating
generating each
each challenge
challenge isis very
very
similar
similar to
to the
the idea
idea behind
behind non-adaptive
non-adaptive blood
blood testing
testing
technique
[lo]. The
The area
area of
of combinatorial
combinatorial group
group testing
testing
technique [10].
concerns
concerns itself
itself with
with perfonning
performing group
group tests
tests on
on subsets
subsets of
of
aa given
given set
set to
to identify
identify defective
defective elements
elements in
in that
that set:
set: A
A

be listed
listed in
in an
an order
order (which
(which
Let the
the words
words in
in CCj
1.1. Let
j be
will be
be randomly
randomly changed
changed at
at every
every authentication
authentication
will
session) as
as WI,
wl,...
. . .,,Ww,.
session)
w

3This
isis based
3 ~ h igame
game
s
based on
on asking
asking the
the players
players to
to think
think of
of an
an object
object and
and
answer
answer the
the classification
classification questions
questions asked
asked by
by the
the 20Q
2 0 4 Artificial
Artificial IntelliIntelligence
gence Game
Game device.
device. See
See http://www.20q.net!
http://www.20q.netl

2. For
For each
each word
word Wi,
wi,let
let the
the £C bit
bit binary
binary representation
representation
2.
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1 : Mnemonic Generation and Selection:
Selection: Initial selectionI of the mnemonic sentence
Figure I:
sentence involves
involves the users, since memorability
depends on individual
of a sentence depends
individual experiences and tastes.
tastes.

. . . , bi,o.
bi,o.
of i be denoted as the bit string bbiye-1,
ofi
i ,£-l,""

password system: We would use our system for entering 40 of the 52 bits, and the missing 12
12 bits would be
handled as private salt in a similar fashion to what was
described in [13]
[I31 -- by the front-end essentially trying all
212
12 bits. The password
2 12 possibilities for the remaining 12
file
file would stay the same as before our system was deployed, as would the password: We act only as a front
end, for special situations where normal keyboard entry
risky.
is either impossible or risky.

0,....
. . ,, £e -- 11 in turn, the server's
server's ques3. For k == 0,
Qk is constructed as follows:
follows: Every Wj
wj whose
tion Qk
bi.k
=1
1 is included in Qk.
Qk.
bi,k =
The number of server asks £ questions, and each question is constructed without any dependency on which elCjj is the "contaminated"
"contaminated" one,
one, mj.
m j . The server
ement of C
Cjj such
can easily determine mj: It is the only word of C
that all of the Q
Qk's
k' s that contained it were answered with a
"yes" by the user. Note that, this scheme is not restricted
"yes"
to inputting passwords using mnemonics, and it can be
used to input plain text passwords when the challenges
contain single ASCII symbols.
When the equivalence classes have a size of 16
16 as in
our example, each challenge will have 88 words and the
user will be asked 4 questions. An example question for
finding which word is the mnemonic word in the last colfollows:
umn of Table 1I would be as follows:

4.3 Duress Codes
After the user picks a mnemonic sentence the system will
randomly decide a position, o,
0, on the password bit string
,, P. This random position information is stored in the
salted hash of the user. Our system provides two different duress codes to the user. We decided to provide at
least two duress codes to protect the user even when the
attacker is aware of the fact that the system has duress
code and asks the user to write down two different passwords and show which one is the duress code, which one
is the original password.
Duress password will differ only at one of the 2 poo. If
If the entered passsitions that comes after position o.
word differs from the correct password at anyone
any one (and
only one) bit in this sequence, the system will interpret
the login attempt to be performed under duress. It will
let the authenticating server know about the duress situation, let the user authenticate and send an alarm to the
police. Note that, if the entered sequence differs at more
than one bit from the duress sequence, the system will interpret this entry as a wrong password and will deny the
authentication. This restriction is required in order not to
increase the chances of successful dictionary attacks.
For example, when the user's password is equal to
P =
= 0101100101010011111101001000101010001101
and 0o is 37. The mnemonic sentence is Angry union
artists simply dismissed demand to forgive the laziness
laziness of
of
"mayor" encodes
the crazy mayor:
mayor. The mnemonic word "mayor"
"1 101I'',, and the sequence of bits marked
the last four bits, "110
by the duress marker (37) is "10". Then "president" (encoding "100
I"), and "assistant"
"assistant" (encoding"
(encoding " IIII
1 1 1 1 ") will
coding"
100 1"),
be displayed to the user as the duress codes. The user
is free
free to memorize all three or choose the two that are
easier to remember.

• "Does your mnemonic contain one of the following
words?:"
words?:"
-- "senator, foe,
ally,
foe, queen, chairman, mayor, ally,
assistant, supporter"
The user answers 40 such questions in total (4 for each
10 mnemonic words) with a "yes"
"yes" or a "no"
"no"
one of the 10
"yes" or
signal using the switch (equivalently with 11for "yes"
o0 for "no").
"no").
After the answers are collected, the system extracts
each password substring encoded by the mnemonic
words. These substrings are concatenated in the order
corresponding to the order of words in the source sentence to form P.
P. The hash of P with the salt is compared to the hash value kept in the password file
file (where
the hash value is stored as in the regular UNIX password
file). Note that the same password file
file can still be used
file).
with the ASCII passwords.
Our current password size of 40 bits falls
falls short of the
52 bits commonly used in deployed systems,
systems, but we are
confident that we will be able to exceed the 52 bits in
the continuation and further refinement of this work. In
the meantime, even in its present form our current implementation is suitable for use as a front-end to a 52-bit
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 2: One of the possible set of challenges Qo to Q3
Q g that could be created for the last column of Table 1.
1. The challenge words
are presented in random order and in the fonn
form of CAPTCHAs for added security against sophisticated key-loggers. In the absence
of such concerns the challenges can be displayed as text images in alphabetical order. It is also possible to display them in plain
fonnat on text-only consoles or LED displays.
text format

5

Related Work

bandwidth accessibility.
accessibility.
The closest work to ours is the "pass-thoughts"
"pass-thoughts" authentication system proposed by Thorpe et al. [17]. Passthoughts system is based on recognition of unique brain
signals send by the users. This system benefits from the
[20] that can take a brain signal, extract
BCI technology [20]
its features and then translate or classify these features
into a command. They list the following set of requirements for an authentication system: i) changeability (in
case the old one is stolen); ii) shoulder-surfing resis( e.g. acoustic recording of
tance; iii) theft protection (e.g.
keyboard sounds, or brute force attacks on the password
file);
file); iv) protection from user non-compliance (such as
sharing the password); v) usability (i.e. fast and easy
authentication). In order to fulfill
fulfill all of these requirements, the authors design an authentication scheme that
is solely based on training a user to think about the same
idea (e.g. a place, a thing, or a melody), and recording
the repeatable parts of the brain signal features
features extracted
from this "pass-thought". In theory a password space
based on pass-thoughts would be very large, since humans can generate many different pass-thoughts, however Thorpe et al. note that the BCI technology, that
was available when that paper was published (September
2005), was not able to provide a communication channel with enough bandwidth that can carry a unique brain
signal. The users were able to input approximately 25
bits per minute using a BCI device. Since such a lowbandwidth has limited the applicability of pass-thoughts
as a high entropy authentication system, the authors provided a feasible pass-thoughts system, where they provide the user with a screen that has a grid of several
several
characters and the user is asked to generate a sequence

Previous studies state the requirements for increasing
the accessibility of electronic resources for disabled
4] and suggest possible techniques
[l, 7,
7, 6, 14,
14, 2, 41
users [1,
(including both hardware and software solutions) to in5, 8].
crease the bandwidth of input from these users [11,
[ l 1,5,8].
There is also a body of work for providing access to web
through smaller devices which have limited input capa191. These two research areas have a considerbilities [3, 19].
able overlap in the design requirements such as assumption of low input bandwidth, emphasis on usability,
usability, and
the need for platform independence. Trewin discusses
the overlap between the accessibility requirements for
desktop browsers for Web, and the requirements for a
usable Mobile Web in [19].
Mankoff et al. discuss the needs of motor disabled
[I41 .. They define this
users for accessing the web in [14]
access as a "low
"low bandwidth" access, due to the fact that
these users can produce only one or two signals,
signals, when
communicating with a computer. These users usually
use a switch mechanism that can be controlled in a variactivated switches, pneumatic
ety of ways, such as button activated
switches, switches that are operated by a muscle movement such as raising an eye brow [11],
[ l l ] , or Brain Computer Interface (BCI) [20]. Mankoff et al. introduced
the design requirements for accessibility of web pages
user, these requirements include makby motor-disabled user,
ing currently selected link highlighted, allowing the user
access to the bookmarks as links or adding links for skipping unwanted text. They have implemented a proxy and
a web browser that can render any given web page and
fulfills the requirements of low
convert it into a page that fulfills
8

of P300 potential spikes,
spikes, hence highlight several characters one by one on this grid using a BCI device that
allows disabled people to spell words.
words. This BCI device records the evoked P300 potentials (generated by
the brain 300ms after a surprising or an exciting event)
from a user and highlights a random item on the screen
for each one of the detected potential, in time the user is
expected to learn how to control the P300 potentials and
input the same sequence of P300 potential spikes (i.e. the
pass-thought) to the system.
verification of the passsystem. The verification
thought is performed by comparing the hash of this input
(recorded spikes) with the hash of previously recorded
pass-thought.
In 2004, Yan et al. conducted a controlled experiment
to compare the effects of giving three alternative forms
forms
of advice about password selection [22].
[22]. This trial involved 400 first-year students at Cambridge University.
100
100 of these students were given the classical instructions on how to pick a password:
password: "" Your password should
be at least seven characters long and contain at least one
non-letter." 100
100 of them were given a paper that has the
letters A-Z and integers 1-9
1-9 repeatedly on it, and they
were asked to close their eyes and randomly pick symbols from this letter to generate a random password, later
they were asked to write it down and carry that paper
with them until they memorize the password. The other
100
100 students were given an instruction sheet that explains
how to generate mnemonic passwords.
passwords. The last 100
100 were
not given any instructions at all. Yan et al. performed
several well-known attacks on these passwords,
passwords, as well
as analyzing the statistical properties of these passwords
(e.g. length) and the frequency of the users' need for a
password reset.
This study challenged several
several widely accepted beliefs
about security and memorability of passwords:
passwords:

in security
security by just educating users to use random
or mnemonic passwords;
passwords; both random passwords
and mnemonic passwords suffered from a nonnoncompliance rate of about 10%
10% (including both tooshort passwords and passwords not chosen accordaccording to the instructions).
instructions).
The lack of compliance of users can also be explained
with the lack of
of incentive. User incentive
incentive can be created by refusing non-compliant passwords or by providproviding an easy to use authentication
authentication scheme,
scheme, or by bundling
small incentives
incentives from several
several systems into a large incentive. In our system,
tive.
system, we provide encouraging incentives
incentives
to the users for complying with our instructions.
instructions. Some
of the user incentives
incentives we provide are as follows:
follows:
• for users with motor disability
disability providing we provide
a way to authenticate themselves without the help of
another person,
person, and for all users we provide a way
to authenticate themselves
themselves when they are faced with
an input-constrained environment either due to the
lack of a keyboard or due to high risk of shoulder
surfing.
surfing.
• allowing the users to pick the mnemonic sentences
that fit to their taste,
taste, hence are memorable to them,
them,
from
from a set of mnemonic sentences generated by the
system.
system.
• providing an easy password reset mechanism.
mechanism.
In 2005, Jeyaraman and Topkara proposed a system
that automatically generates memorable mnemonics for
a given random password [12].
[12]. This system is based on
searching for a mnemonic that encodes the given password in a pre-computed database of mnemonics, which
is generated by taking sentences from a text-corpus and
producing syntactic and semantic variations
variations of these sentences. In order to produce the variants of corpus sentences, they used linguistic transformations (e.g.,
(e.g., synonym substitutions).
substitutions).
A recently introduced mnemonics based password au[I81 allows
allows the
thentication scheme by Topkara et al. [18]
users to maintain a multiplicity
multiplicity of truly random passwords, which are independently selected,
rememberwords,
selected, by remembering only one mnemonic sentence. An adversary who
breaks one of the passwords encoded in the mnemonic
sentence does not gain information about the other passwords. A key idea is to split a password into two parts:
parts:
One part is written down on a paper (helper card), ananother part is encoded in the mnemonic sentence.
sentence. Both
of these two parts are required for successfully reproducing the password,
password, and the password reconstruction from
these two parts is done using only simple table lookups.
lookups.
In this scheme changes to passwords do not necessitate

1.
1. It is confirmed that users have difficulty remembering random passwords (Many students continued to
carry the written copy of their password for a long
time, 4.8
4.8 weeks on the average.).
average.).
2. The results also confirmed that mnemonic passwords are indeed harder for an adversary to guess
than naively selected passwords.
passwords.
3. Contrary to the popular belief
belief that random passpasswords, this exwords are better than mnemonic passwords,
periment showed that mnemonic passwords are just
as strong as the random passwords.
passwords.
4. This study also showed that it is not harder to remember mnemonic passwords,
passwords, which are just as
memorable as naively selected passwords.
passwords.
5. Another interesting result of this study is that it
is not possible to gain a significant
significant improvement
9

perhaps even a sharp-eyed visitor gets to read the password.
Finally,
Finally, our system is nowhere near its final
final form,
form, and
we will continue to actively work on enhancing it along
many directions, including the use of more sophisticated
natural language processing techniques than the simple
ones we are using currently.

a change in the mnemonic sentence,
sentence, only requirement is
the generation of a new helper card.
[12, 18],
181, the mnemonics
Note that in both schemes, [12,
are used as an aid to remember text passwords,
passwords, whereas
the current paper enables the use of the mnemonic sentence to serve as the password itself. In the current paper our main challenge is to construct an authentication
mechanism that can work in restricted environments. We
present a suggested mode of use for other mnemonic
password schemes that use other media mnemonics including graphics, and audio besides text. The scheme in
this paper provides resistance to phishing, to keystrokelogging, to shoulder surfing as well as to dictionary attacks.
The study of Reverse Turing Tests in [16]
[16] suggests
a method to ensure that it will take a pre-determined
time to break a password with an automated attack if
the adversary has to use the login system.
system. This is
achieved by judicious use of challenges by the system
that require computational capabilities of a human ( e.g.,
CAPTCHAs [21]).
[2 I]). PassWit can be complemented with
a similar system such that the adversary is even further
limited in the time that it is required to break a password.
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